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What is at stake
In 2007, the Treaty makers ennobled the former fundamental principles of the Treaty
on European Union as European values. Respect for human dignity, freedom,
democracy, equality, rule of law and the protection of human rights have henceforth
transcended the sphere of ‘merely’ legal matters. They have been posited as widely
shared and deeply rooted normative orientations and thus the true foundations of
the common European house. This step was probably meant to tap a new source of
legitimacy and stability.
Today, however, this step feeds a perception of a deep crisis: when founding values
appear weak or controversial, the entire house may crumble. The union of values
might prove no less risky than the union of money. At present, this perception is
fed especially by measures with which governments intervene with independent
institutions and, thus, according to widespread concerns, weaken them critically.
Hungary and Poland provide the most blatant examples. Most consider the value
of the rule of law to be endangered, but the values of democracy and human rights
are no less at stake. Indeed, political science qualifies such measures restricting
control of the governing majority as symptomatic for illiberal democracies, i. e. for
authoritarian tendencies.
European constitutionalism is perhaps facing a ‘constitutional moment’. The
European Union has to decide whether it comprises illiberal democracies or whether
it fights them. The first case would allow ‘illiberal democracies’ to co-inform the
interpretation of the common values, heralding the end of the European Union’s
current self-understanding. The alternative path requires the Union to resist illiberal
threats. To achieve this, European constitutionalism must draw and defend ‘red
lines’, which would also imply a considerable constitutional development: European
constitutionalism would gain in profile and develop elements of a militant democracy.
Its eventual move into the latter direction is deeply controversial. Some even recall
what Carl Schmitt characterised as the ‘tyranny of values’: a defence of values which
destroys the very values it aims to protect.
To act or not to act
The European legal space requires that all public institutions within its scope respect
its fundamental values. Its legal orders have mutually committed to a constitutional
core. At the same time, the law leaves open whether and how public institutions
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are to defend these values across borders. Various options can be found and
constitutional arguments speak both for and against defending the Union’s values.
Powerful arguments suggest caution. One of those arguments calls for respecting
domestic democracy and national identity. Another valid argument is the
consideration not to damage the Union. Any attempt to force an elected government
under a common constitution can easily result in explosive conflicts, just look at
Spain. It seems possible that a European defence of values may fail, which might
inflict lasting damage on the Union’s authority and demonstrate the frailty of the very
foundations of the common European house.
But success, too, might plunge the Union into serious trouble. If the Union prevails
over a combative Polish government, this would imply an enormous proof of power.
It would significantly gain in stature vis-à-vis its Member States, should it succeed
in transforming its instruments, so far widely considered as rather ineffective, into a
kind of trenchant federal execution. This might trigger fierce reactions.
At the same time, there are substantial legal grounds for the Union to defend
European values. Three arguments appear particularly pertinent. A first reason
results from the Union’s  self-understanding as a liberal-democratic peace project
as we know it. A second reason lies in the Union’s mandate to protect all individuals
in the European legal space. This includes protecting Polish citizens against
their own government when the latter turns repressive. Union citizenship finds a
fundamental political dimension. A third reason is the principle of mutual trust. In
the LM (Deficiencies in the system of justice) judgement, the Court made it clear
that: measures such as the Polish ones endanger the fundamental structure of the
Union because they undermine mutual trust, without which vital areas of European
cooperation cease to function.
Fundamentals of systemic deficiencies
Such problems are often framed as systemic deficiencies. Indeed, this concept helps
to better understand fundamental legal issues when it comes to defending European
values. Four elements are key.
Firstly, speaking of a systemic deficiency usually means expressing the opinion
that another legal order has significantly changed for the worse. In the European
legal space, the term systemic deficiency mainly refers to a communication not
within a legal order, but between legal orders. In our case, this mainly means
speaking about Hungary or Poland from the outside. And it is inflammatory talk. The
communication is not just about any kind of behaviour, but one that is assumed to
be particularly problematic: a violation of fundamental values. Referring to systemic
deficiencies contains a serious reproach and is thus prone to escalation. It holds
considerable potential for conflict within a setting which, according to the basic
logic of the European legal space, relies on close and trustful cooperation. It runs
transversely to the general communication style, which aims at consensus. The legal
regimes of pertinent instruments must cater for that with adequate procedures and
prerequisites.
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The need for such legal regimes is further stressed by the concept’s second
characteristic: denoting something as a systemic deficiency often implies exercising
public authority. When invoking the language of systemic deficiencies, the speaker
usually does not only utter an opinion, but aims at counteracting and, if possible,
eliminating measures of the other party. In other words, if a public institution
of one legal order qualifies the actions of another legal order as systemically
deficient, it deliberately creates pressure to eliminate the deficiency. The qualification
as systemically deficient can result in legal sanctions, e.g. suspending voting
rights (Article 7 Para. 2 TEU), imposing financial penalties (Article 260 TFEU), or
discontinuing of judicial cooperation.
Public authority is also exercised if this qualification as systemically deficient only
results in a “soft” measure, such as a bad grading in the EU Justice Scoreboard.
Such qualification diminishes the reputation of the state concerned, which affects
the domestic standing of a governing majority and its position in European as well
as international relations. Measures damaging a state’s reputation cannot stand in a
legal vacuum, but have to be legitimized by a corresponding legal regime.
The third element is a breach of law. This requirement is concealed by the term
value as values are normally standards beyond the law. However, the values of
Article 2 TEU are laid down in the Treaty on European Union, a legal text, and not
only in the declaratory part, i.e. the preamble, but also in the operative part. They
are conceived to be binding and to be applied by public institutions in procedures
established by law. The interpretation and application of Article 2 TEU must therefore
follow the standards of legal reasoning; political, ethical or moral rationalizations are
not at place.
A systemic deficiency is not caused by just any breach of law. The term denotes only
particularly problematic situations, which is the concept’s fourth characteristic. The
TEU itself provides an indication: Article 7 Para. 1 TEU refers to a “serious breach”,
Article 7 Para. 2 TEU to a “serious and persistent breach”. A systemic deficiency
with regard to the rule of law might lie in widespread corruption that questions the
implementation of Union law to such an extent that it ceases to stabilize expectations
in a Member State. Since the Union is a union of law, such characteristics call the
entire enterprise into question. The same holds true when the national courts no
longer effectively exercise any checks on the government, or when elections turn
unfair. On a horizontal level, there is a systemic deficiency for instance, when a
Member State cannot surrender a person to another Member State because that
would result in a serious conflict with fundamental rights. The vanishing point for
understanding systemic deficiencies is the interrelatedness of the legal orders
constituting the European legal space.
Fundamentals of legitimate action
All things considered, the need is for constructing legal regimes which augment
legitimacy without foregoing the effectiveness of any European action. This applies
to all instruments that might be used to defend European values. These are of
diverse legal nature: political, administrative and judicial, binding and non-binding.
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The most important building blocks are permissibility, procedure, and a logic for
substantiating the material standard.
As any qualification as systemically deficient is prone to escalation, any such
action should be in the hands of institutions that can shoulder such a responsibility
and manage conflicts. Article 7 TEU plays a key role in this regard. It might be
understood as limiting any defence of European values to its highly demanding
procedures, culminating in the need of a unanimous decision by the European
Council. If Article 7 TEU were to be understood as the only legal tool for defending
the Article 2 values, all other measures by other Union organs would become
impermissible. The defence of the values would be completely under the control of
the national governments, united in the Union’s institutions. Responsibility would be
crystal clear. The important drawback, however, is that Article 7 TEU is extremely
difficult to use, leaving European values with little protection.
This explains the search for additional instruments. Indeed, it is well-established
under Union law that a specific procedure designed to deal with a certain problem
does not exclude developing other instruments, an accepted doctrine since the Van
Gend en Loos judgement. Accordingly, it is, in principle, permissible to develop new
instruments, such as the Commission’s Rule of Law Framework, or using the EU
budget to defend EU values. However, any new instrument needs an appropriate
legal basis. This requirement results from the necessity to legitimize any action of
public authorities, including ‘soft’ measures. Thus, the first building block of any
instrument dealing with systemic deficiencies is to verify whether its adoption and
use are supported by a legal basis.
The judicial operationalization of European values
The defence of values by political institutions has not been very effective so far. As
so often in the history of integration, the judiciary might compensate for this. Given
the CJEU’s general role in the union of law, there is a presumption that values can
play a role in procedures under the Articles 257, 258 and 267 TFEU. However, the
issue of justiciability of valuesis sensitive. For a long time, many considered the
values beyond the Court’s reach.
In two judgements from 2018, however, the CJEU decided for the judicial
operationalization of the rule of law value. In the case Associação Sindical dos
Juízes Portugueses (ASJP), the Court inferred standards for the independence of
all national judges from Article 19 TEU interpreted in light of Article 2 TEU. In the LM
(Deficiencies in the system of justice) case, it even enabled individuals to defend
European values. The case dealt with the protection of the separation of powers
via the essence of the fundamental right to an impartial court and to a fair trial. This
expansion of judicial competence mirrors the importance of the values and the
judiciary’s general role in the European legal space. By now, there is a judicial line
of defence beyond the political rationality of Article 7 TEU. Even a criminal sentence
might serve as an instrument to defend European values.
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The pivotal point of the CJEU’s LM (Deficiencies in the system of justice) judgement
is the fundamental right to a fair trial, Article 47 para. 2 CFR. It expresses a far
broader general legal principle which, in the European legal space, protects not
only individuals, but also public authorities. Moreover, it applies not only in judicial
procedures, but whenever a legal subject is faced with the exercise of public
authority, especially when substantial interests are at stake. This is the case with
respect to conflicts concerning the nature and consequences of systemic deficiency:
the interests in question here are the national reputation, the interest of prosecution,
the effective functioning of the national judiciary, financial interests as well as
participation in the institutions of the Union. A fair procedure is important not only for
the legitimacy of any specific decision, but also for general cohesion in Europe.
It is crucial, therefore, that national courts including constitutional courts, must refer
any such case to the CJEU as this is the only forum where the foreign government
can get a fair hearing. In the context of such procedures, national courts should
frame the relevant case not as an issue of national identity, but as an issue of
European values. For liberal Europe to stand, it needs to speak with one voice.
Fundamentals of interpretation and application
By using the term ‘value’ in Article 2 TEU, the Treaty makers imply that the provision
is to be understood as vague and open. Importantly however, this openness cannot
be invoked as an authorization for the Union’s institutions to gradually outline an
ever more detailed common constitutional frame for the Member States. Such
an understanding would force their constitutional autonomy into a far too narrow
corridor, going against European constitutional pluralism. Developing the values of
Article 2 TEU into the DNA of the European legal space would be incompatible with
the diversity protected by Article 4 TEU.
With regard to the interpretation of Article 2 TEU, this implies the following: The
instruments for fighting systemic deficiencies may only serve the cause of ensuring
the fundamentals of the European legal space, in particular the union’s self-
understanding as a community of values, the core of fundamental rights, and the
principle of mutual trust, but nothing more. This explains the values’ vagueness as
well as the extremely high hurdles in Article 7 TEU. This logic of restraint extends
to the entire toolbox. Consequently, the values are to be interpreted such as to only
prohibit particularly problematic measures, but without indicating a ‘right way’, let
alone stipulating the basic organization of Member State institutions. In this sense,
European values are not be understood as Alexy’s ‘optimization requirements’, but
rather as ‘red lines’.
With regard to the application of Article 2 TEU, the above constitutional
considerations imply the following: The determination that a value has been violated
can and even should rest on a comprehensive assessment, with all the problems
that this involves. Indeed, the Commission’s and the CJEU’s pertinent decisions
mostly consider a series of facts in the light of principles that remain abstract.
Such an application, which essentially consists in a comprehensive assessment
of developments, events, measures and political statements, is an exercise in
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discretion and hence inevitably evaluative, and in that sense political. This easily
gives rise to the accusation that such decisions are biased or motivated by illicit
considerations.
Yet, this practice is justified. Firstly, it is the inevitable consequence of the restrained
interpretation, which in turn is justified by the constitutional considerations described
above. Secondly, the practice responds to the specific problems of legally capturing
authoritarian tendencies.  In most cases only a series of actions and measures
in their entirety will reach the critical threshold. The actions and measures, taken
individually, can often be plausibly justified by comparison with some legal order
which is ‘beyond doubt’.
A promising way to fend off the critique that such comprehensive assessment
is biased, is to support the assessment with concurrent evaluations by other
independent institutions, institutions with a recognized authority concerning
questions of values. And indeed, this is what the Union’s institutions mostly
do. To put it in the words of the network logic of the systemic deficiency: the
regular application takes place in an Einschätzungsverbund, i.e., showing that
the comprehensive assessment of all circumstances is widely shared. The more
institutions perceive a substantial problem, the stronger the evidence for a systemic
deficiency. When it comes to systemic deficiencies, interpretation and application are
not presented as being autonomous, but as part of a collective assessment involving
many institutions of various legal orders. The Commission and the CJEU, but also
many other institutions, recur to other authoritative sources when dealing with such
questions, in particular to judgements of the ECtHR and opinions of the Venice
Commission. Evaluations of international bodies as well as civic organizations are
also relevant. Thus, a situation or measure is more likely to qualify as systemically
deficient the more institutions of the various legal orders share this assessment.
Again, it is fundamental for the common defence of European values that Europe
speaks with one voice.
The fundamental message
To many people, the European institutions appear distant and foreign. If these
institutions urge or even try to force democratically elected governments to revise
important political projects, by invoking European values, they run the risk of being
rejected as self-important, arbitrary and illegitimate actors. In order to credibly defend
European values, any institution must make use of fair procedures to convincingly
show a broad European public what the values require, why they have been violated,
what needs to be done, and why it is not squashing European diversity.
The union of values is as risky and difficult as the union of money. So there is hope;
after all, Europe was able to manage the severe crisis concerning the latter. The
European idea is more resilient than many people might assume. Indeed, European
resilience can unfold a particularly strong potential in this respect: the rejection of
illiberalism after manifold terrible experiences.
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This post is an abridged version of A. von Bogdandy, Principles and Challenges of
a European Doctrine of Systemic Deficiencies, Max Planck Institute for Comparative
Public Law & International Law (MPIL) Research Paper No. 2019-14. Many thanks to
Jakub Jaraczewski for help in that process.
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